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Admiralty
by Robert S. Glenn, Jr.*
Colin A. McRae**
and Jessica L. McClellan***
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's
admiralty docket was not particularly active this year, perhaps reflecting
the state of the maritime practice. Interestingly, it was a good year for
district court judges in the circuit, as the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
nearly all of the lower courts' maritime decisions in the context of
sovereign immunity, maritime statutes of limitation, jurisdiction,
international carrier bonds, limitation of liability, allision, maritime
liens, choice of law, and pollution.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The Eleventh Circuit saw one of its admiralty opinions reviewed by
the United States Supreme Court. In Northern Insurance Co. of New
York v. Chatham County, Georgia,1 the Supreme Court addressed the
assertion of sovereign immunity by Chatham County, Georgia (the
"County"), the owner of a drawbridge that malfunctioned and damaged
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a boat insured by the petitioner.2 The County contended that it was
immune from suit because it was an arm of the State of Georgia and
therefore was protected from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.3
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
held that sovereign immunity did indeed extend to counties and
municipalities when acting under a power delegated to them by the
state. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed this holding and concluded that the
common law had created a "residual immunity" that protected subdivisions of the state like the County in this case.4
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.'
The Court, citing Alden v. Maine,6 held that only states and "arm[s] of
the state" possess Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits under
federal law.7

The Court determined that the County in Northern

Insurance was not an arm of the state and rejected the lower courts'
conclusions that the County fell under a broader "residual immunity"
from suit.8

The Supreme Court also rejected the County's alternative argument
that the Court should recognize "a distinct sovereign immunity against
in personam admiralty suits arising from a county's exercise of core state
functions with regard to navigable waters."9 The Court cited Workman
v. New York City1" in rejecting the County's argument, holding that
there is a general precedent that sovereign immunity does not protect a
city from an admiralty suit." In Workman the Court concluded that
admiralty courts have jurisdiction over municipal corporations. 2 The
County, however, argued that Ex Parte New York13 was controlling. 4
In Ex ParteNew York, the Court held that no redress could be granted
because the Court did not have jurisdiction over the municipality.'" In
Northern Insurance, the Supreme Court distinguished Ex Parte New
York on the ground that there was no jurisdiction over the person or

2. Id. at 1692.
3. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
4. N. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct. at 1692.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 1692, 1695.
527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
N. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct. at 1693.
Id.
Id. at 1694.
179 U.S. 552 (1900).
N. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct. at 1694.
Workman, 179 U.S. at 565.
256 U.S. 490 (1921).
N. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct. at 1694.
Ex ParteNew York, 256 U.S. at 498.
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property in that case, whereas in Northern Insurance, there was no
question that 1the
defendant was an entity within the jurisdiction of the
6
district court.
7
is another decision in 2006 involving
Cranford v. United States"
sovereign immunity. In Cranford the plaintiffs filed complaints against
the United States for personal injuries and death suffered in an allision
of a pleasure boat and a submerged wreck. The complaints alleged
negligence by the government in marking the wreck and in refusing to
remove the wreck. The plaintiffs maintained that the district court had
jurisdiction over their claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act,'8 the
in Admiralty Act, 9 the Public Vessels Act,2 ° and the Wreck
Suits
21
Act.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama
dismissed the complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the
ground that the United States had not waived its sovereign immunity.22 The district court relied on United States v. Gaubert23 to conclude that "the marking of the ... [w]reck and refusal to remove it fell
within the 'discretionary function exception' of the Federal Tort Claims
Act . . . and that the waivers of sovereign immunity in24 the Suits in
Admiralty Act and the Public Vessels Act did not apply."
The issue on appeal was whether the discretionary function exception
to the waivers of sovereign immunity in the Suits in Admiralty Act and
the Public Vessels Act applied to decisions of federal officials in marking
and choosing not to remove a submerged wreck.25 To resolve this issue,
the court addressed three matters: (1) the legal standard for the
discretionary function exception; (2) whether the marking of the wreck
fell within the exception; and (3) whether the refusal to remove the
wreck fell within the exception.2 6
In addressing the legal standard for the discretionary function
exception, the court in Cranford discussed the test outlined by the
United States Supreme Court in Gaubert. The test involves a two-step

16. N. Ins. Co., 126 S. Ct. at 1695.
17. 466 F.3d 955 (11th Cir. 2006).
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (2000).
19. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-52 (2000).
20. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 781-90 (2000).
21. 33 U.S.C. §§ 409, 411, 412, 414, 415 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); Cranford,466 F.3d
at 956-57.
22. Cranford, 466 F.3d at 957.
23. 499 U.S. 315 (1991).
24. Cranford, 466 F.3d at 957-58 (citations omitted).
25. Id. at 956.
26. Id. at 957.
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inquiry: (1) "whether the conduct involves 'an element of judgment or
choice'" and (2) "whether the judgment or choice is grounded in
considerations of public policy, because the 'purpose of the [discretionary
function] exception is to "prevent judicial second-guessing of legislative
and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political
policy through the medium of an action in tort."'"27 The Eleventh
Circuit held that the marking of the wreck and the refusal to remove it
were "discretionary decisions grounded in social, political, and economic
policy," and thus, the court affirmed the district court.
III.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Jane Doe (A.H.) v. Carnival Corp.29 involved a suit against a cruise
line by a passenger. The passenger claimed that she was sexually
assaulted by a ship employee while aboard the ship when she was
seventeen years old. The only issue on appeal was whether the plaintiff
was barred from suit by the statute of limitations.3 0
Although the statute of limitations for maritime personal injuries is
three years, the defendant cruise line was permitted to contract for a
shorter limitations period.3 ' Carnival sent each passenger a contract
whereby the passenger agreed to a one-year limitations period for the
filing of any personal injury suits for injuries sustained while aboard the
ship. The plaintiff in Jane Doe did not dispute the fact that she signed
this contract upon purchase of her cruise ticket. However, she claimed
that the contract she signed establishing a one-year limitations period
was not valid because she signed it as a minor, and therefore, the
maritime three-year statutory limitations period trumped the contractually shortened one.32
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
entered summary judgment for the shipowner on the ground that the
plaintiff was time-barred from bringing suit, and the court of appeals
affirmed.3
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that 46 U.S.C. app.
§ 183b(a) 34 contained a restriction that permitted the cruise line to
contract for a shorter statute of limitations, provided such period was

27. Id. at 958 (quoting OSI, Inc. v. United States, 285 F.3d 947, 950 (11th Cir. 2002);
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322-23).
28. Id. at 956.
29. 167 F. App'x 126 (11th Cir. 2006).
30. Id. at 127.
31. Id. (citing 46 U.S.C. app. § 183b(a) (2000)).
32. Id. at 127-28.
33. Id.
34. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183b(a).
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not less than one year.3" Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiff's
assertion that because she was a minor at the time of execution, the
contract in which she agreed to a one-year limitations period was
unenforceable.3 " The court cited 46 U.S.C. app. § 183b(c) 3 7 in concluding that the contract was indeed enforceable and that the one-year
period began to run when a guardian was appointed or the minor
reached the age of majority.3 8 Therefore, 46 U.S.C. app. § 183b(c) did
not render void the contractually shortened limitations period; it merely
tolled its operation. 9 The plaintiff in Jane Doe filed suit more than
one year after her eighteenth birthday and thus exceeded the one-year
period allotted by the contract; this period began to run from the date
the plaintiff reached the age of majority and not from the date of the
injury.40 Therefore, the plaintiff's personal injury claim against the
defendant was barred by the statute of limitations.4 '
IV.

INTERNATIONAL CARRIER BOND

United States v. Kafleur4 2 involved another cocaine smuggling vessel.
The defendants were Washington International Insurance Co. ("WIIC")
and an entity known as Riverside Shipping ("Riverside"), which acted as
an agent for vessel owners or charterers. Riverside filed a customs form
for one of its vessels, the M/V GREAT NORTHEASTERN EXPRESS
("EXPRESS"). The EXPRESS did not arrive at its expected destination
and was towed by the U.S. Coast Guard to Miami Beach. It was there
that the Coast Guard discovered a steel box containing 89.9 pounds of
cocaine. The Coast Guard then instructed the EXPRESS to continue to
its final destination for formal entry, where upon docking, the crew fled
before an investigation could be conducted or a manifest could be
retrieved.43 United States Customs then issued a notice of statutory
penalty to Riverside under 19 U.S.C. § 1584" for $1000 per ounce of
cocaine found aboard and $100,000 for the full amount of the surety
bond. The government agreed to mitigate the penalty from $1,438,400
to $143,840, but the defendants still refused to pay the penalty or the

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Jane Doe, 167 F. App'x at 127.
Id.
46 U.S.C. app. § 183b(c) (2000).
Jane Doe, 167 F. App'x at 128.
Id.
Id.
Id.
168 F. App'x 322 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 323-24.
19 U.S.C. § 1584 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
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surety bond amount. The government then initiated suit to compel
payment of these fines from an international carrier bond."5
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
dismissed the motions of the principal and surety for summary judgment
and granted summary judgment to the government. The district court
found that the defendants were liable under § 1584 for the full amount
of the $100,000 bond.
The principal and surety appealed, and the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that (1) the principal and bond were
not outside the scope of enforcement provisions of the Tariff Act; 7 (2)
the government's demand for a manifest was not a prerequisite to the
imposition of penalties under the Tariff Act; (3) the principal was not
entitled to an evidentiary hearing to ascertain whether the captain of
the vessel had knowledge that the cocaine was onboard; and (4) the
surety waived appellate consideration of arguments raised for the first
time on appeal. 48
Riverside's first argument, which alleged that the principal and the
international carrier bond were outside the scope of the enforcement
provisions, was rejected by the court on the ground that Riverside, as the
ship's agent, contracted with the surety and was listed on the bond.49
Therefore, Riverside was held liable for the actions of the principal
under § 1584(a)(2) because it was clear that Customs intended for the
carrier bond to ensure the payment of any penalties imposed.5 °
The court also rejected Riverside's second argument, which alleged
that penalties could not be assessed where there was no demand for or
production of a manifest.5 Citing Gillam v. United States,5 2 the court
concluded that penalties for failure to include merchandise on a manifest
apply when the manifest is produced and merchandise is missing or
when no manifest is produced at all.5" Regardless of whether a formal
demand for the manifest had been made, the crew was to stay aboard
the ship until the inspection was completed.5 4 Therefore, the argument
that penalties cannot be imposed where no manifest has been produced

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Kafleur, 168 F. App'x at 324.
Id. at 324-25.
19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1681b (2000).
Kafleur, 168 F. App'x at 325-27.
Id. at 325.
Id.
Id. at 325-26.
27 F.2d 296, 301 (4th Cir. 1928).
Kafleur, 168 F. App'x at 325.
Id. (citing 19 C.F.R. § 4.7(b) (2007); 19 C.F.R. § 4.1(b)(2) (2007)).
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lacked merit, especially where drugs were found onboard and the crew
fled the vessel.5
The district court did not address Riverside's third contention that it
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to assess whether those in charge
of the vessel knew about the presence of the cocaine.5 6 The Eleventh
Circuit stated that the master and owner of the vessel are not the
parties who would be held liable when there was another entity acting
as the surety.17 In the case at bar, Riverside was named on the bond
for the EXPRESS, so the issue of whether the captain or owner of the
EXPRESS knew of the presence of the cocaine was irrelevant because
neither was charged with a Tariff Act violation.5 8 Regarding this
argument, the court stated that it was unclear whether Riverside was
disputing the EXPRESS's status as a "common carrier."59 Since the
issue was not clearly presented to the district court, the Eleventh Circuit
declined to address it on appeal. 60
The Eleventh Circuit also refused to address Riverside's final
argument that its affirmative defenses raised genuine issues of material
fact, which should have precluded a grant of summary judgment. 6'
Because Riverside failed to include the affirmative defenses of assumption of risk and estoppel in its motion for summary judgment, the
defenses were considered abandoned and could not be brought up on
appeal, even though they were argued in Riverside's answer to the
government's amended complaint. 2 The court cited Road Sprinkler
FittersLocal Union No. 669 v. Independent Sprinkler Corp.6" to support
the conclusion that "[tihe district court 'could properly treat as abandoned a claim alleged in the complaint but not even raised as a ground
for summary judgment.""4
WIIC, the insurance company, asserted two arguments on appeal, but
the court refused to address them, as the arguments had not been raised
before the district court. 5 After a de novo review of the appellants'
arguments, the Eleventh Circuit held that there were no material issues

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

64.
65.

Id. at 326.
Id.
Id. at 326-27.
See id. at 327.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
10 F.3d 1563 (11th Cir. 1994).
Kafleur, 168 F. App'x at 327 (quoting Road Sprinkler, 10 F.3d at 1568).
Id. at 327-28.
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of fact in dispute and upheld the grant of summary judgment to the
government. 66
V.

LIMITATION OF LiABILITY

In PG. Charter Boats, Inc. v. Soles,67 the owner of a vessel filed a
limitation of liability action pursuant to the Limitation of Liability
Act.68 The Limitation of Liability Act limits a vessel owner's liability
for any damages from an accident to the value of the vessel and its
freight.69 Soles, an employee of Quality Inspection Services ("QIS"),
was injured by a defective anchoring device while inspecting gas lines
aboard the NAV1, a barge owned by P.G. Charter Boats ("P.G."). Soles
and QIS filed a cause of action in Alabama state court for bodily injury
and negligence against several defendants, including three fictitious
corporations. These corporations were named as parties to the suit
because at the time the complaint was fied, the identity of the owner of
the NAV1 was not yet known. During discovery, Soles learned that P.G.
was the owner of the vessel and moved to amend his state court
complaint to expressly name P.G. as a defendant. This limitation of
liability action was filed by P.G. thirteen months after the initial
filed but only six months after P.G. was formally added
complaint was
70
as a party.
P.G. filed a limitation of liability action naming Soles and QIS as
claimants, and Soles and QIS moved to dismiss the action as untimely.
The court agreed with Soles and QIS that P.G. had failed to file the
action within six months of receiving written notice of the claim. When
the action was dismissed for not being within the requisite six-month
period, P.G. filed an appeal.7 1 The sole issue on appeal was whether
the initial state court complaint provided sufficient written notice to PG.
to begin the running of the six-month filing period or whether P.G. did
not have notice until the complaint was amended, and it was formally
added as a party to the lawsuit.72
Pursuant to § 185 of the Limitation of Liability Act, a party must have
"written notice of a claim" before the six-month filing period begins to
run, but the Act does not state what information must be included in the

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 328.
437 F.3d 1140 (11th Cir. 2006).
46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-196 (2000); P.G. CharterBoats, 437 F.3d at 1141.
P.G. CharterBoats, 437 F.3d at 1142 (citing 46 U.S.C. app. § 183(a)).
Id. at 1141-42.
Id. at 1142.
Id. at 1142-43.
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written notice to constitute adequate warning. 73 Courts have developed
two tests to answer this question. v4 Under the first test, the notice
must "'reveal a "reasonable possibility" that the claim made is one
subject to limitation.' 7 1 Under the second test, the writing must: "'(1)
demand a right or supposed right; (2) blame the vessel owner for any
damage or loss; and (3) call upon the vessel owner for anything due the
claimant.'" 6 P.G. argued that it did not have adequate notice that
Soles was asserting a claim against it because the original complaint did
not explicitly name P.G. as the vessel owner."
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with P.G., holding that Soles's original
complaint clearly asserted claims against the owner of the NAV1, which
was sufficient under both tests to put P.G. on notice of the pending
allegations.7 The court concluded that the fact that P.G.'s name was
not used in the initial complaint was not determinative because it was
clear which vessel was at issue and Soles clearly stated that he intended
to sue the owner of the vessel. 79 Therefore, because P.G. knew that it
was the owner of the NAV1, it was put on notice of the pending claims
thirteen months before it filed the limitation of liability action and was
therefore time-barred from bringing its claim. 0
VI.

ALLISION

Boat passengers sued the charterer of a stationary barge when their
pleasure boat allided with the barge in Superior Construction Co. v.
Brock. s ' An "allision," as opposed to a collision, is defined as "'[tihe
sudden impact of a vessel with a stationary object such as an anchored
vessel or a pier."'8 2 The passengers of the pleasure boat sustained
injuries due to the accident and subsequently filed this cause of
action. 3
Superior Construction Co. ("Superior") was the general contractor for
the Florida Department of Transportation project to widen the Blanding
Boulevard Bridge over the Cedar River in Jacksonville, Florida. For this
project, Superior chartered a barge called MOBRO 605 and a tug called

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. (citing 46 U.S.C. app. § 185).
Id. at 1143.
Id. (quoting Paradise Divers, Inc. v. Upmal, 402 F.3d 1087, 1090 (11th Cir. 2005)).
Id. (quoting ParadiseDivers, 402 F.3d at 1090).
Id.
Id. at 1143-44.
Id.
Id. at 1145.
445 F.3d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1336 n.1 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 75 (7th ed. 1999)).
Id. at 1338.
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MARY ANNE from Mobro Marine. The barge was 128 feet long, 38.5
feet wide, and 7 feet deep, and the tug was 36 feet long, 14.5 feet wide,
and 4 feet deep. The barge was painted black, as were the hull and
lower superstructure of the tug. Because Mobro Marine did not provide
lights with the chartered vessels, Superior developed its own lighting
strategically on the barge and
scheme, consisting of ten lights positioned
84
two lights on the stern of the tug.
During the project, Superior usually stationed the barge and tug in a
manner that allowed recreational boaters to pass under the bridge
because Superior had witnessed the frequent passage of boats through
the designated channels during the six months of construction.
However, on the night of the allision, the barge was parallel to the
bridge so that it blocked all but thirty-eight feet of the 120-foot channel.
In addition to that danger, the tug was moored perpendicular to the
barge. The vessels remained so positioned for the duration of the
holiday weekend.85
On the night of the allision, only three of the ten lights on the barge
and only one of the two lights on the tug were working. 8 One of the
three barge lights was described by an eye witness as "'looking like a
bathroom nite-light,'" and the other two barge lights and the one tug
light were flashing white lights.87 These four lights were described as
"old, scratched, sun-damaged, rust-stained, dirty, and generally in poor
condition."8 8 The court determined that the "[barge's black color,
inadequate lighting, and unorthodox location rendered it virtually
invisible to recreational boaters on the Cedar River."89
The plaintiffs in this case-the injured boaters-attended a family
gathering at a house located near the Cedar River on the night of the
accident and then decided to go on a pleasure boat ride. Prior to the
boat ride, the driver of the vessel and some of the passengers had
consumed alcoholic beverages, and the defendants argued that this
contributed to the allision. However, there was evidence that the driver
of the pleasure boat slowed the speed down from thirty-five mph to
twenty-two mph and accurately aimed his boat through the channel
according to the painted arrows drawn under the bridge. The driver had
frequently driven his boat under the bridge at night, and the driver and
the nonintoxicated passengers testified that they had an unobstructed

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 1336-37.
Id. at 1337.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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view and yet could not see the barge until it was too late to avoid the
allision.9 ° Although there was conflicting evidence, the district court
assumed arguendo that the driver was intoxicated beyond the legal limit
but found that his legal intoxication wag not a cause of the allision.9 1
The suit against Mobro Marine was subsequently dismissed after
mediation, and Superior brought a limitation of liability action pursuant
to the Limitation of Liability Act.92 Following a bench trial, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida entered judgment
for the passengers and awarded economic and noneconomic damages in
the amount of $19,214,689.63. The defendant appealed. 9 The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that the barge and the tug
were liable for the passengers' injuries and that the operator of the
pleasure boat was not comparatively at fault for his intoxication. 94
On appeal, Superior argued that the plaintiffs did not meet their
burden of proving that their intoxication could not have caused the
allision under the Pennsylvania Rule.95 The court found that this
burden was met and discussed the differences between the Pennsylvania
Rule, the Oregon Rule, 96 and the Louisiana Rule. 97 Superior argued
that the Oregon Rule should apply and that there should be a presumption of liability of the plaintiffs because they were the moving vessel and

90.
91.

Id. at 1337-38.
Id. at 1338 & n.6.

92. Id. at 1338 & n.7; see 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 183-89 (2000).
93. Superior Construction,445 F.3d at 1338-39.
94. Id. at 1347-48.
95. Id. at 1339. Under the Pennsylvania Rule, when a vessel is, at the time of a
collision, in actual violation of a statutory rule intended to prevent collisions, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the violation, if not the sole cause, was at least a contributory
cause of the collision. The PENNSYLVANIA, 86 U.S. 125, 136 (1874). In such a case, the
burden rests upon the vessel to show not merely that her fault might not have been one
of the causes, or that it probably was not, but that it could not have been a contributing
cause of the collision. Id.
96. The OREGON, 158 U.S. 186 (1895). The Oregon Rule creates a rebuttable
presumption of fault against a moving vessel that, under its own power, allides with a
stationary object. Id. at 197. The "'presumption of negligence may be rebutted by
showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, either that the allision was the fault of the
stationary object, that the moving vessel acted with reasonable care, or that the allision
was an unavoidable accident.'" SuperiorConstruction,445 F.3d at 1339-40 (quoting Bunge
Corp. v. Freeport Marine Repair Inc., 240 F.3d 919, 923 (11th Cir. 2001)).
97. The LOUISIANA, 70 U.S. 164 (1865). The Louisiana Rule is similar to the Oregon
Rule in that while both presume fault on the moving vessel, under the Louisiana Rule, a
vessel drifts into a stationary object, while the Oregon Rule involves a vessel that moves
under its own power into a stationary object. Id. at 173; Superior Construction,445 F.3d
at 1340 n.10.
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the barge and tug were stationary.98 The court held that this presumption gives way to the Pennsylvania Rule when the stationary vessel is in
violation of a statute designed to prevent allisions. 99 The stationary
vessel then bears the burden of proving that its violation was not a
contributory cause of the allision. ° ° In this case, Superior violated
statutes pertaining to the obstruction of channel navigation' 01 and
failed to meet its burden under the Pennsylvania Rule. 10 2 The Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that at least some fault must be
apportioned to a driver who was legally intoxicated.' 3 It affirmed the
trial court's finding that the allision could not have been attributed to
the alcohol level of the plaintiff, as the plaintiff handled the boat in a
manner indicating that his motor skills, control over the vessel, and
mental faculties were not impaired due to alcohol.0 4 The evidence
indicated that had the barge and tug boat not been obstructing
navigation of the channel, the plaintiff would have safely maneuvered
the boat under the bridge.' 5
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the award of economic and noneconomic damages and held that
neither award was clearly erroneous or excessive.' 6

VII.

EQUIPMENT AS APPURTENANT

The Eleventh Circuit addressed the question of what equipment is
appurtenant to a vessel in Motor-Services Hugo Stamp, Inc. v.MIV
Regal Empress.' 7 The REGAL EMPRESS is a luxury cruise ship. A
maritime lienholder brought this cause of action against the vessel for
failure to pay for work performed while it was in a shipyard. Plaintiff
Maritime Telecommunications Network ("M.T.N.") was the provider of
telecommunications and internet services for the ship, and it filed a
motion requesting removal of its equipment from the vessel before it was
to be sold in a judicial foreclosure sale. The United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida denied the motion but filed an order
segregating certain sums to remain within the court's registry until any

98.
99.

Superior Construction, 445 F.3d at 1340.
Id.

100. Id.
101. See 33 U.S.C. § 409 (2000).
102.

Superior Construction,445 F.3d at 1340, 1343.

103. Id. at 1344-45.
104.

Id. at 1345.

105. Id.
106. Id. at 1347-48.
107. 165 F. App'x 837 (11th Cir. 2006).
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objections to the sale could be filed. The ship was sold for $1,750,000,
and no objection was filed.'08
Three months later, M.T.N. filed a motion for the court to reconsider
the initial decision approving the sale of the vessel without the removal
of the telecommunications equipment. M.T.N. requested that the court
rule as a matter of law that it was entitled to recover the money for the
equipment, but the court refused to do so. The court determined that
M.T.N. did not file a timely objection to the order for sale of the REGAL
EMPRESS, and it agreed with the district court that the telecommunications equipment was appurtenant to the vessel and could not be removed
before it was sold. 109 The court noted that it is "unimaginable in
today's world that a luxury cruise ship could be successful without a
fully functioning telecommunications system." 110
Because M.T.N.
failed to present any new evidence disputing the determination that the
equipment was essential to the ship's navigation and operation, the court
refused to grant the plaintiff's motion."'
Citing SS Tropic Breeze v. Tropical Commerce Corp.,"2 The Augusta,"3 Gonzales v. M/V Destiny Panama,"4 and Gowen, Inc. v. F/V
Quality One," 5 the Eleventh Circuit concluded that like radio equipment, uninstalled engines, and fishing permits, telecommunications
equipment is an appurtenance subject to a maritime lien on the
ship."
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the
district court and held that the procedure employed by the district court
the manner in which
for the judicial sale of the REGAL EMPRESS and
7
the plaintiff's claim was handled were proper.1
VIII.

CHOICE OF LAW IN A MARITIME CONTRACT

In Dresdner Bank AG v. M/V Olympia Voyager,11 the Eleventh
Circuit issued an important decision regarding choice of law rules to be
applied in maritime contract disputes. Dresdner involved a claim by a
Greek travel agency against a cruise vessel following an in rem action
brought by a German bank seeking to foreclose on the ship's mortgage.
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The district court entered a default judgment of foreclosure and ordered
the vessel sold. Subsequently, numerous entities filed claims and
motions asserting rights to share in the proceeds of the sale. One such
entity was the Greek travel agency Aktina Travel, S.A. ("Aktina"), which
had contracted with the owners and operators of the OLYMPIA
VOYAGER to provide airline tickets between Greece and the United
States for the vessel's crew members. The parties negotiated the
agreement and orally contracted in Greece, and Aktina provided the
travel arrangements via phone from Greece.' 19 Aktina asserted a
claim for a maritime lien under the Commercial Instruments and
Maritime Liens Act 2 ' based on the provision of travel services that
benefited the vessel.' 2' Judgment was entered in favor of Aktina on
its claim for payment from the proceeds of the sale of the vessel, and the
bank (standing in the shoes of the vessel) appealed.'22 The central
issue on appeal was the proper choice of law to be applied to the
underlying suit. 2 '
The court of appeals first determined that a conflict of law existed
because United States law would afford a maritime lien to Aktina, while
Greek law would not.'24 To determine which law applies in an admiralty case, courts generally examine a number of factors outlined by the
United States Supreme Court in Lauritzen v. Larsen 25 and Hellenic
Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis.'26 Because Lauritzen and Rhoditis addressed
maritime choice of law analysis in the tort context, the court of appeals
instead looked to the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Gulf Trading & Transport
Co. v. The Vessel Hoegh Shield'27 for guidance on choice of law analysis in the breach of contract context."' s The Gulf Trading analysis
applies the Second Restatement 129 approach to choice of law questions
and bases the decision upon a determination of which sovereign entity
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has the "most significant relationship" with the transaction. 1 0 This
Restatement approach examines the following factors: "[1] the place of
contracting; [2] the place of negotiation; [3] the place of performance; [4]
the locus of the subject matter in the contract; and [5] the domicile of the
parties." 3 '
The court in Dresdner focused on the "place of performance" and the
"locus of subject matter" factors in deciding that Greek law governed
Aktina's claim. 132 Both the place of contracting and the place of
negotiation was Greece, which was also the domicile of the parties
involved. 133 Because Aktina is a travel agent and not a physical
transport service, the court decided that the "performance" involved was
3
the actual purchase of the tickets, which was done in Greece. 1
Furthermore, the invoices were to be paid in euros, rather than dollars,
and the breach of the contract took place in Greece. 35 The Eleventh
Circuit therefore concluded that the locus of the subject matter was
Greece, where the tickets were procured." 6 The court also addressed
the "significant relationship" test under Restatement section 6 and
determined that Greece had a more significant relationship and greater
interest in the transaction.'3 7
Because the governmental interest
analysis and the substantial relationship analysis both favored
application of Greek law, the court held that the district court's
application of United States law was clearly erroneous. 38 Once it was
determined that Greek law governed, the court held that Aktina was not
entitled to a maritime lien superior to the bank's preferred mortgage lien
because Greek law does not provide for such a lien.'39 Aktina's request
for payment of its claim from the proceeds of the foreclosure sale of the
vessel was therefore denied. 40
IX.

POLLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS

The defendant in United States v. Stickle' was charged with and
convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District
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of Florida of deliberate pollution of international waters. The defendant
then appealed his convictions of (1) conspiring to violate the law of the
United States and (2) knowingly discharging an oily mixture into the sea
without an oil discharge monitoring system. The defendant admitted
that laborers aboard the vessel, the S.S. JUNEAU, discharged contaminated wheat and diesel fuel into the South China Sea without the proper
monitoring system. However, Stickle, the owner and chairman of the
company that managed and operated the JUNEAU, the Sabine
Transportation Company ("STC"), claimed that the charges should have
been dismissed because (1) the JUNEAU was not a freight vessel as
defined in the charged statute and (2) venue in the Southern District of
Florida was not appropriate as the government was required to prove
14
venue beyond a reasonable doubt, which it failed to do.
' The Elev143
convictions.
the
affirmed
Appeals
of
Court
Circuit
enth
STC was a company with headquarters in Iowa that owned, managed,
and operated a fleet of tank ships used to transport cargo. Stickle was
the owner of this and other like entities. The JUNEAU was purchased
by STC and was originally built as an oil tanker. The U.S. Coast Guard
conducted an inspection of the vessel and issued a Certificate of
Inspection permitting the JUNEAU to operate as a freight vessel for a
single trip to Bangladesh. The vessel also obtained a Form A International Oil Pollution and Prevention certificate, which is required
of
T
freight vessels, as opposed to a Form B certificate for oil tankers. 4
The JUNEAU's cargo consisted of 113,000 metric tons of wheat. It
stopped in Singapore to load diesel fuel en route to Bangladesh. Upon
arriving at its destination, crew members aboard the JUNEAU realized
that the fuel leaked onto the cargo deck and contaminated the wheat on
board. As a result of the contamination, the Bangladeshi purchasers
refused delivery of the goods. Due to barriers to unloading the
contaminated wheat in Bangladesh, the JUNEAU headed back out into
the South China Sea with the oil-covered wheat still onboard. Various
options for dumping were discussed for more than a month with Stickle
and other officers. Eventually, the decision was made to discharge the
wheat overboard, and because the vessel was not a certified oil tanker
and did not have a Form B, it did not have the proper monitoring
devices for discharging the wheat and oil.'"
The JUNEAU arrived back in Portland and learned that the Coast
Guard would be inspecting the vessel. During the crew member
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interviews, the captain and some members sought to minimize the effect
of the contamination by falsely stating that the wheat was contaminated
by sea water rather than by oil. Following these interviews, a criminal
investigation ensued, and the FBI became involved. In addition to lies
told by the captain and some crew members to FBI agents, a false letter
was sent by Stickle and the corporate office stating that they were not
aware of this illegal dump.146
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo the district court's denial of the
motion for a judgment of acquittal and denial of the motion for improper
venue. 4 v In response to Stickle's argument that he was not properly
charged with violating 33 C.F.R. section 151.10(a) 4 8 for knowingly
discharging contaminated wheat and fuel into the sea without the proper
discharging monitoring device, the court determined that the JUNEAU
was accurately characterized as a freight vessel, rather than an oil
tanker. 49 Disagreeing with Stickle, the Eleventh Circuit determined
it was irrelevant that the JUNEAU was originally constructed for use
as an oil tanker.15 The court stated, "[I]t is undisputed that the S.S.
JUNEAU was certified, inspected, and approved for use as a freight
vessel."'
The court further noted that the vessel obtained a Form A
certificate rather than a Form B certificate, and for a Form A certificate
there is no inspection of the monitoring devices because the vessel is not
being certified to transport oil.' 52 Therefore, an indictment under 33
C.F.R. section 151.10(a), which applies to "a ship other than an oil
tanker," was applicable to the JUNEAU.'53
The defendant also argued that the government failed to establish
venue by a preponderance of the evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt
under 18 U.S.C. § 3238"" and therefore violated his due process
rights.'5 5 The court stated that "[it has long been settled that when
the government is proving a non-essential element of a crime, like venue,
the prosecution is not required to meet the reasonable doubt stan-
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dard.""5 ' Thus, a preponderance of evidence is standard enough,
and
57
the government satisfied this burden in establishing venue.
Defendant Stickle also claimed that venue was not proven for the
conspiracy count of the indictment because all overt acts of this
conspiracy occurred on the high seas and in Iowa.'58 The Eleventh
Circuit did not dispute this fact but pointed out that a false statement
was made by one of the coconspirators while he was in West Palm
Beach, Florida.159 The court held that this established venue in the
Southern District of Florida.1 60
The defendant also stated that venue did not exist under § 3238 for
the knowing discharge of contaminated grain and fuel without proper
monitoring devices because the locus delicti of this count was the high
seas. 6 ' The court determined that when this is the case, venue can
be established by looking to the last known residence of any offender,
which in this case was the Southern District of Florida. 162 The
Eleventh Circuit concluded there was no merit to the defendant's
contentions and affirmed the convictions. 1'
X.

CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT

In Altadis USA, Inc. v. Sea Star Line, LLC,'6 the Eleventh Circuit65
examined the effect of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act's ("COGSA")1
one-year statute of limitations on cargo losses sustained during the
inland portion of a shipment under a through bill of lading.'
Altadis
involved the transport of a container of cigars from Puerto Rico to
Tampa, Florida, via the port of Jacksonville. The shipper, Altadis,
contracted with an ocean carrier, Sea Star Line, LLC ("Sea Star"), which
issued a through bill of lading for the shipment. The Sea Star through
bill of lading incorporated the provisions of COGSA, including its oneyear statute of limitations. Sea Star engaged the inland carrier,
American Trans-Freight ("ATF"), for the inland portion of the car-
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riage. 167 During ATF's inland transport from Jacksonville to Tampa,
the container was stolen on or about March 18, 2003 and was found
empty on March 25, 2003.168 After Altadis filed suit in the Middle
District of Florida against both Sea Star and ATF for the loss of the
cargo, Sea Star filed a cross-claim against ATF for common law
contribution and indemnity and for breach of contract.'6 9
The district court determined that under the bill of lading and the
applicable provisions of COGSA, Altadis's suit was not timely filed
because it was not served until April 13, 2004.170 The district court
therefore granted the summary judgment motions filed by Sea Star and
ATF on Altadis's complaint. 171 Having thereby determined that
Altadis's complaint was time-barred, the district court (1) denied Sea
Star's motion for summary judgment on the cross-claims it had brought
against ATF for contribution and indemnity and breach of contract
(effectively ruling that those claims were not meritorious) and (2)
instructed the clerk of court to close the case. Altadis appealed the
grant of summary judgment on its complaint, while Sea Star sought
review of the district court's denial of its motion for summary judgment
172
on its cross-claims.

On appeal, Altadis argued that the two-year statute of limitations of
the Carmack Amendment 7 ' should apply because the cargo losses
were incurred during the overland leg of the transport. 174 The Elev-
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enth Circuit disagreed, reasoning that case law has established that the
Carmack Amendment does not apply to a shipment from a foreign
country 175 to the United States unless the domestic, overland leg is
covered by a separate bill of lading. 7 ' The container of cigars was
shipped from Puerto Rico to Tampa under a through bill of lading, so
there was no separate bill of lading for the overland leg from Jacksonville to Tampa. 7 ' The court of appeals therefore affirmed the grant
of summary judgment on the complaint.178
The court of appeals next turned its attention to the district court's
79
denial of the two cross-claims brought by Sea Star against ATF.1
The court noted that Sea Star's common law claim for contribution and
indemnity was properly denied.180 The court noted that "because there
is no liability on the part of Sea Star to Altadis, there is nothing for it
to receive from ATF by way of contribution or indemnity."'
As for
Sea Star's breach of contract claim, which sought a recovery of Sea Star's
attorney fees from ATF, the court of appeals held that the district court
failed to examine the language of the contract in rendering its decision
on this claim.182 The court of appeals therefore vacated the district
court's implicit denial of the breach of contract cross-claim and remanded
that claim to the district court for reconsideration."13
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